Constitutional review and democracy: problems at the core of the case against judicial review of legislation according to Jeremy Waldron
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.24142/raju.v19n39a5Keywords:
judicial review, democracy, Constitution, political philosophyAbstract
Within the framework of the discussion about whether judges should have the power to repeal laws when they are convinced that they violate individual rights, Jeremy Waldron offers a series of arguments that explain his opposition to the democratic model where there is judicial control of legislation. However, the arguments given are problematic to say the least. Therefore, the present text aims to show that the arguments offered by Waldron against judicial control of legislation, at least in the discussion of the essence of the argument, are insufficient to prove its elimination in democratic systems. For this, first of all, we proceed to show the arguments by which the author opposes judicial control. Secondly, we refer to the four conditions necessary for his theoretical argument to be considered. Thirdly, we will address a series of criticisms that can be made to Waldron’s opposition argument. Thus, finally, we intend to show that Waldron’s arguments are insufficient to consider a categorical opposition to judicial control.
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