Effects of preferential voting on the electoral behavior of political parties: the case of the elections to the Senate of the Republic of Colombia between 2006 and 2018

Abstract

This article addresses the effects of preferential voting in the Colombian political party system considering the elections to the Senate of the Republic between 2006 and 2018. Specifically, it asks about institutional incentives for political actors in relation to partisan reputation or personal and its real effects on the electoral behavior of political parties. Theoretically and methodologically, it is based on the post-positivist paradigm, with a neo-institutional approach based on rational choice and a mixed methodology, which combines qualitative instruments and techniques with quantitative indicators. The incentive structure of the Colombian electoral system is identified from the legal regulations used to analyze the behavior of political actors in relation to said incentives. This exercise is based on the need to carry out a systematic study of the effects of the 2003 Political Reform, especially one of its instruments with the greatest influence on political decisions to maximize benefits and reduce costs: the preferential vote.