The strategic defeat of the armed insurgency. The case of the FARC-EP, Colombia, 1994-2010

Abstract

For years, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia - People’s Army (FARC-EP) was considered the main and largest armed insurgency, the number one enemy of the State. Also, since 2012, a process of dialogue and political negotiation between the Colombian government and the farc-ep was carried out, which resulted in ending the military confrontation that lasted more than six decades and enabling a path of reforms and democratic openness for this organization.. There are many factors that explain that the real possibility of the definitive ceasefire between the establishment and the farc-ep has been successful. However, the strategic defeat of the first Colombian guerrillas is the least explored and with few results in the subfield of political analysis. That the guerrilla farc-ep has entered a process of reinstatement is not only explained by an obvious erosion of the war or a window of opportunity for negotiated political departure, but also because on the military political level there was an unfavorable scenario that It failed to overcome. This fact is proposed to analyze based on the joint analysis approach, which recognizes a relational and strategic horizon of political-military action that includes the identification of actors, events, scenarios and correlation of forces and structure-conjuncture relationship based on the literature review of experts and the Center for Research in Military Historical Memory (CIMHM) attached to the Ministry of Defense.