Prácticas de manipulación contable: causas y consecuencias. Un análisis de su justificación teórica

Jennifer Martínez Ferrero; Isabel María García Sánchez

doi:10.24142/rvc.n11a10

Autores/as

Jennifer Martínez Ferrero Universidad de Salamanca
Isabel María García Sánchez Universidad de Salamanca

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.24142/rvc.n11a10

Palabras clave:

Manipulación contable, comportamiento discrecional, teoría de la agencia, teoría positiva de la contabilidad

Resumen

Los continuos escándalos contables que han tenido lugar en la última década han estado vinculados con las denominadas prácticas de manipulación contable, las cuales están basadas en acciones discrecionales llevadas a cabo por los directivos de una empresa con el objetivo de satisfacer sus propios intereses. El objetivo de este trabajo es mostrar no sólo la justificación teórica de estas acciones, sino también sus principales causas y consecuencias. Además, haremos referencia a los principales modelos para la detección de este tipo de estrategias basados en (i) decisiones contables y/o financieras y en (ii) decisiones reales.

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Biografía del autor/a

Jennifer Martínez Ferrero, Universidad de Salamanca

Profesora e investigadora de la Universidad de Salamanca, España. jenny_marfe@usal.es

Isabel María García Sánchez, Universidad de Salamanca

Profesora e investigadora de la Universidad de Salamanca, España. lajefa@usal.es

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